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Proud Inheritors or Petty Contractors? Understanding the BBS phenomenon in Sri Lankan politics | Chaminda Weerawardhana

4 July 2014

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groundviews.org - 5 July 2014

The speech delivered by Ven. Galaboda-atté Gnanasara at a public meeting in the Aluthgama on 14 June 2014 is broadly considered as the primary cause that triggered the subsequent rampage and violence in that area. Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), the organisation of which Ven. Gnanasara is the Secretary General, is squarely accused of encouraging, instigating and perpetrating a bout of Sinhala-Muslim rioting that killed some nine people, injured hundreds and damaged millions worth property. Political analysts unanimously agree that BBS and its most vocal voice, Ven. Gnanasara, and his fiery speech at Aluthgama, were instrumental in triggering the violence. The press is very keen to zoom in on Ven. Gnanasara’s role in rousing anti-Muslim hatred among Sinhala-Buddhists. Colombo Telegraph, to cite but one example, published footage of Ven. Gnanasara’s full speech, with some of its most controversial sections translated into English. Critics have been (quite rightly indeed) near-unanimous in their contempt over some of the language used in the speech, especially the unambiguously pejorative nature of the references to Muslims. In the Sinhalese language, the term marakkala, for instance, is generally considered as impolite, while hambaya carries even more pejorative connotations. The speech also included pejorative references to Islamic religious practices such as male circumcision.

The Buddhist clergy has every right to stand up against what it believes to be proselytization, or any expansionist advances of other religious groups that exploit socioeconomically vulnerable segments of the Sinhala-Buddhist community. However, BBS receives the world’s wrath due to the methods it deploys in executing this mission. Especially after Aluthgama 2014, BBS’s negative international image as Sri Lanka’s face of Buddhist terror has been reinforced. Whereas the Sinhala language print media expressed contempt of the violence, the slightest reference to BBS was avoided, with the blame going to usual international forces (jathantara balavega) trying to destabilise the peaceful, hunky-dory regime. The English language newspapers, however, have been highly critical of BBS. Given the extent of politicisation the press has undergone in ‘Rajapaksarised’ Sri Lanka (from free laptops to regular editors’ encounters at Temple Trees) it is not implausible to assume that a political green light had been given for expressions of such criticism, which, at the present stage, is quite advantageous to the Rajapaksa regime. As the world castigates Sri Lanka over war crimes, human rights violations, repression of dissent and the infringement of civil liberties, critiques of BBS in the English language media provides the regime with a fine example to showcase the extent of press freedom in the country, where, despite the aggression of hardline groups, the press is free to engage in scathing critiques and the military is ever so kind and considerate to rebuild Muslims’ torched properties. As one reads through such critiques of BBS, one also ought to recall that soon after the Aluthgama rampage, there was an alarming lack of coverage of the events in mainstream media. Although individual journalists used their social media channels to communicate on the violence, it was only much later that the mainstream press (especially the English language press) began to report and write critically about BBS. What was the force that triggered such a sudden critical stance? It was surely something more than the journalists’ good conscience.

Although Sri Lanka’s position as a focal point of international attention has receded since the days of the 5th peace process, political developments in Sri Lanka are followed by a number of influential personalities in the West on a near-minute basis, whose opinions are much sought after in academic, policymaking, diplomatic and supra-national lobbies. One such person is Erik Solheim. A cursory glance at Mr Solheim’s twitter feed provides proof of his continuing interest in Sri Lankan affairs. In many a case, such influential international observers unfortunately tend to see what they want to see, ignoring crucial aspects of a complex picture. In the Sinhala-Muslim case, for instance, the emphasis on Mr Solheim’s Sri Lanka-related tweets is near-exclusively on BBS’s villainous nature (which the Sri Lankan liberal lobby highlights as the direct cause of the violence) and violence against moderates. Concerning the latter, Solheim refers to the case of Ven. Watareka Vijitha, victim of an extremist attack. These are indeed issues that require the highest levels of national and international attention. However, more attention and emphasis ought to focus on who writes the play-script and why, and not on the comedians who parrot on-stage. This is the key to the puzzle, and any meaningful international action – be it in the form of non-governmental pressure groups, funding for non-governmental bodies promoting peace and reconciliation, pressure in the domain of high politics, or international support to opposition political parties – could be taken.

This article seeks to shed light upon the question of what BBS represents in the present-day Sri Lankan political landscape. In so doing, it is deemed worthwhile to delve into BBS’s ideological centrepoints and their historical antecedents. As for Aluthgama 2014, it is of interest to reflect upon the Marakkala Kolahalaya, or, as George Rowell puts it, Ceylon’s Kristallnacht which devastated British Ceylon a century ago. This politico-historical reflection is helpful in placing BBS’s rhetoric and ideology in perspective, but, as I shall subsequently argue, it is inadequate in understanding BBS’s exact role in the present-day Sri Lankan political sphere. That role is best understood in the backdrop of the power dynamics at interplay in Rajapaksa-led Sri Lanka. The mammoth caveat of an article of this nature is that it does not provide adequate space to delve into the specifics of ideological linkages between BBS and Buddhist revivalist currents in 19th and early 20th century Ceylon. It is also inadequate in that (and although much of this article’s core argument was shaped by recent interactions with a number of senior figures in government, opposition and academia) this writer has not yet had the opportunity of interacting personally and directly with BBS’s key personalities. A diachronic and historically informed reading of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology in present-day Sri Lanka is best carried out in the form of a lengthy monograph. The present article, however, is intended at contributing to (and questioning) existing debates and dominant readings of BBS, as an extremist agitator, an unprecedented religious nationalist current, and an instigator of communal violence.

Anti-Islam movements: a comparative perspective?

The anti-Islam fervour that engulfed the world since 9/11 has not subsided in the last decade. In every western state, there are clearly articulated anti-Islam lobbies, which – not dissimilar to Ven. Gnanasara’s and BBS’s view of Islam – express contempt of Islamic practices, from the veil to ideas on procreation, not to mention debates on the construction of mosques and minarets. Every so often, ministers of religion harbouring controversial views on Islam stand up in open protest, giving expression – as Dr Kalana Senaratne accurately observes (concerning the attitude of many a Sinhala-Buddhist to Ven. Gnanasara’s controversial claims) – to views that many subscribe to, but are reluctant to openly voice. The recent controversy over Pastor James McConnell of the Whitewall Metropolitan Tabernacle in Northern Ireland, who describes Islam as satanic (a statement that First Minister Peter Robinson readily backed, stating in public that he would only trust a Muslim to go to the shops for him), is exemplary of the seething layer of Islamophobia, present in nearly every non-Islamic sociocultural context in a multitude of forms. If a cue is to be taken from the recent EU polls, the electoral successes of far-right wing parties (whose aversion to the Islamic faith and cultural practices is no secret) across several electorates could also be read as an overall expression of anti-Islam and and-anti-Muslim attitudes. Acts of vandalism on Islamic places of worship also constitute a globally proliferated phenomenon, and should not be conceptualised as something unique to any given country or region. On 29 April 2014, to cite but one recent example, a mosque was profaned in the otherwise considerably peaceful village of Kruszyniany in eastern Poland (a region home to the Tatars, an Islamic community living in the region since the 14th century). A prominent slogan written on the walls was ‘Resistant Poland’, an expression from the WWII era, which is being fast claimed by far-right-wing activists. In the South and Southeast Asian region, Myanmar’s 969 Movement has been the most famous anti-Islamic voice. Its chief personality, Ven. Ashin Virathu, has been described in Western media as the instigator of a strong anti-Muslim (anti-Rohingiya, to be precise) discourse, which has received a wide following in the Buddhist community of Myanmar. Similarly, Thailand has also been home to violent clashes between Buddhist and Muslim groups. It is in the backdrop of this broader picture that the ‘ideology’ that BBS purports to propagate is best conceptualised. Concerning BBS’s activism, one writer highlights the necessity of distinguishing between the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim dimensions of BBS rhetoric. In terms of the former, BBS’s ideas share commonalities with fellow travellers across the globe. The anti-Muslim dimension is very much associated with the local sphere, and the legacy of conflictual and prejudiced relations between the Sinhala and Muslim communities, which can be traced back to the Sinhalese antagonism of Coast Moors, which found expression in the riots of 1915, especially in Colombo, where Coast Moor businesses were attacked.

However, as it will be highlighted below, BBS’s ideology and fiery rhetoric are somewhat unhelpful in fathoming that organisation’s position and role in the present-day Sri Lankan political landscape, in which the prospect of national elections loom, with a government whose powerbase slips onto thin ice in the absence of the crucial criterion that brought it to power in the first place: ethno-national mayhem.

BBS and the Legacy of Buddhist Revivalism

In nearly each of his public orations, Ven. Gnanasara proudly refers to the Buddhist revivalist tradition, spearheaded by monk leaders such as Ven. Migettuwatté Gunananda, The Most Ven. Hikkaduwé Sri Sumangala, and lay leaders such as Anagarika Dharmapala.[1] These characters occupy near-canonical positions of esteem and respect in the Sinhala-Buddhist socio-political tradition. From children’s story books to standard school textbooks, the work of Ven. Gunananda (best known for his oratorical feats at the Panadura-vadaya, an intense debate with Christian priests in Panadura in 1873), Anagarika Dharmapala and The Most Ven. Hikkaduwé Sri Sumangala (as well as other leaders of Buddhist revivalism) is given pride of place. The contributions of such pioneers in reviving the Buddhist establishment, Buddhist education and in the revival of the Sinhala language and literature are often evoked with deference, admiration and a profound sense of (Sinhala-Buddhist) national pride. The BBS leadership seeks to highlight a parallel between BBS’s mission and objectives with those of the late 19th and early 20th century Buddhist revivalists. This is evident, for instance, in Ven. Gnanasara’s constant reiteration in his public speeches that he represents ‘the great Migettuwatté Gunananda tradition’. It is also of interest to observe Ven. Gnanasara’s keenness to remind fellow Bhikkus at each public meeting (Bodu Maha Samulu) he attends that they are the proud inheritors of the Gunananda/Sri Sumangala tradition of patriotic Buddhist leaders, who stood bravely to protect Sinhala-Buddhist interests at times of external infringement. This image of the Buddhist monk as a provider of guidance to the country’s socio-political life is one that carries tremendous significance in the Sinhala-Buddhist sociocultural mindset. Among the monk leaders and politicians who came to occupy centre-stage in the politics of post-5th Peace Process Sri Lanka, Ven. Gnanasara can be considered as the monk who best grasped this reality. The discerning analyst must never underestimate the substantive impact that such statements can have on BBS’s Sinhala-Buddhist audience. The promise of the present-day manifestation of a Sangha leadership that represents the Great Gunananda/Sri Sumangala tradition is strong enough to leave many Sinhala-Buddhists elated and deeply moved, perceiving in Ven. Gnanasara and BBS their quintessential ‘protectors’.

The BBS, it appears, is also in the good books of the high priests (Mahanayaka theras). BBS has been keen to make public displays of good relations with the highest levels of the Buddhist establishment. BBS’s ideas, except perhaps a rare fringe, enjoy tremendous popularity among Buddhist monks at all levels. Even the Most Ven. Wavuldena Knanissara, chief prelate of the Amarapura Maha Nikaya, the only high-profile monk to issue a statement after the Aluthgama violence, has been extremely cautious to avoid any criticism of BBS. This substantive support base within the Bhikku community is one of BBS’s primary strong points.

The Buddhist monk as protector of Sinhala-Buddhist interests?

The monk-protectors of Sinhala-Buddhists, as BBS claims itself to be, are more dependable than the petty politicos who come around at election times and fly away in fancy cars and helicopters thereafter. Here is a group of saffron-robe-clad guides, who represent a long tradition of Bhikkus that tirelessly stood for Sinhala-Buddhist interests. The image of the monk-leader exhumes a sense of reliable leadership, with a historically proven commitment to Sinhala-Buddhist interests. This public sentiment equates, to a considerable degree, to the long-standing lament in Sinhala folklore of not having a dedicated ‘ruler’ who would unconditionally protect the Sinhalese-Buddhists (which is captured in the verse Ané kubinné thopatath rajeku inné…). Ven. Gnanasara evokes this point in his Aluthgama speech, expressing his (and by implication BBS’s and the Maha Sangha’s) preparedness to give leadership and guidance to the Sinhala-Buddhists. This Sinhala-Buddhist protectionist discourse is articulated in such a way that it appeals to the ordinary Sinhala-Buddhist listener with a shock-wave effect. This is Ven. Gnanasara’s primary strength and his key skill, which have enabled him to emerge as a leading public figure second to none in so short a span. However, as I shall argue later in this article, BBS may deploy the analogy to the Buddhist revivalist tradition in its propaganda and outreach efforts, but in reality (and as opposed to a view upheld by some analysts), BBS does not represent a present-day exponent of the Buddhist revivalist tradition.

[. . .] READ FULL TEXT HERE : http://groundviews.org/2014/07/05/proud-inheritors-or-petty-contractors-understanding-the-bbs-phenomenon-in-sri-lankan-politics/

P.S.

The large extract from the above article from groundviews is reproduced here for educational and non commercial use