Dawn (July 9, 1999), Op-Ed.


Kargil: scattered realities

By Dr Mubashir Hasan



TWO remarkable occurrences in the fighting in the Kargil-Drass sector have not received the recognition they deserved. One, the feat of the Mujahideen to scale and occupy, with all the militaryparaphernalia, forbidding heights, will surely be regarded in guerilla history as a great achievement.

It is without parallel in the world of guerilla warfare. Two, the restraint shown by the government of India in not crossing the Line of Control despite provocation, even humiliation.

It was a wise political decision which, perhaps, prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, placed in similar situation, would not have taken. Prime Minister Vajpayee's decision not to cross
the LoC should not be dismissed by Pakistanis with the argument that the Indian invasion would have been repulsed by Pakistan. Might be so, but the Indians hold a different view of their
capability. In any case, what has stopped leaders from taking foolish decisions and bringing misfortunes to their people? Pakistan has a few to its own discredit.

Unfortunately, the aforementioned remarkable feats coincide with wrong stands taken by the two governments. On their part, Pakistan television and radio should not have gone along with much of the print media in over-playing the Mujahideen's heroic feat as an enduring achievement in positional warfare. The position the government is taking now, after a useless trip to Washington, could have been taken much earlier. Foolishly it allowed the temper and expectations of the people to rise on an untenable basis and now it will have to reap what it did not prevent from being sown earlier.

There is little logic in the stand of the Indian government that it will not talk peace unless the Kargil-Drass heights have been cleared of the Mujahideen. It is quite civilized for nations to talk during war-like conditions. The fact is that groups of Mujahideen have been operating in Indian-held Kashmir for the last eight to ten years. There, they have been all the year round. The government of India had all along been accusing Pakistan of aiding and abetting them. But that did not stop it from talking to Pakistan, indeed, taking notable, unprecedented steps towards peace-making. While the two prime ministers were talking peace in Lahore, guns were booming across the Line of Control. To withhold the peace process now is unfortunate, illogical and against the best interests of the subcontinent.

It is fortunate that today the peoples of India and Pakistan overwhelmingly stand for peace. They want their governments to move in the direction of improving relations and settling disputes. The favourable post-Lahore summit atmosphere in both the countries is a testimony to this assertion. It would not be possible in future for any government in the two countries to hinder this process for any significant period. The will of the people shall prevail in the long run, especially when they have so little faith and confidence left in the political leadership of both the countries irrespective of who is in power.

Sooner or later, governments of the countries of South Asia will have to come to terms with the reality of proxy wars. The 70-year-old process of the weakening of highly centralized government
has reached a stage in the subcontinent when it is no longer possible completely to eradicate sections of armed dissidents. The fight for nationalist, religious and sectarian causes is going to be a
permanent feature in our countries for many years to come.

There are three kinds of armed dissident war-waging groups in South Asia, namely, religion-based, nationalism-based and religious-nationalism-based. The purely religion-based, such as those in Pakistan and India, are on a weak wicket in developed agricultural and industrial societies. They do well only in tribal areas. The nationalism-based groups can do well anywhere depending upon the development of their national consciousness and prevalence of inequities in the social order. However, those groups who wage war against established governments on the basis of religious nationalism are almost insuppressible in mountainous areas.

The experience of the USSR in Afghanistan and Chechnya and that of India in occupied Kashmir may be cited as evidence. It may be politically expedient to explain away the successes of dissidents
by putting the blame on assistance from a third party but that is only an unimportant factor. Third parties, lots of them, shall always be available in such conditions. New Delhi, Islamabad, Ankara,
Baghdad, Tehran, Dhaka and other capitals will have to make generous adjustments with them.

There is no alternative for the governments of India and Pakistan but to resume the peace process as well to associate dissident Kashmiris. The more they delay, the greater will be harm to them
domestically and internationally, politically, socially and economy-wise.