It is possible to imagine that Pakistan may choose to respond to an Indian conventional attack by using one or a few nuclear weapons as a signal to India to terminate the attack or risk a larger escalation possibly including use of nuclear weapons against Indian cities. Indian policy makers have sought to deter such possible Pakistani use of nuclear weapons on the battle-field. In 2003, India‟s cabinet announced that as part of India‟s nuclear doctrine, “nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.†43 The explicit mention of “Indian forces anywhere†suggests that Pakistan‟s battle-field use of nuclear weapons against Indian conventional forces could trigger an Indian nuclear response, possibly also on the battle-field.
The same logic prevailed between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, which led to the deployment of large numbers of battle-field nuclear weapons by both sides. These large numbers suggest that the United States and Soviet Union had decided that the threat of battle-field use and retaliation was likely to be taken to be more credible than the threat to escalate directly from a conventional conflict to an attack on a major target in the other state. Nonetheless, each side anticipated that a war would escalate to all out nuclear war and the destruction of cities. This will likely be the case in South Asia, and adds to the futility of preparing for the battle-field use of nuclear weapons.