Latest Complications in the J&K Conundrum: A Chronology and Initial Analysis by Siddiq Wahid* Ladakh House August 22, 2008 In
situations like the latest imbroglio in Kashmir, it is always best to
try to first recount as objective a chronology as is possible of the
latest events, followed by analysis rather than try to present both
ingredients in simultaneous mix. It serves the purpose, I feel, of
keeping one honest in any attempt at analysis and also allows the
readers (assuming a certain familiarity on their part with the overall
political conditions apropos of Kashmir) to form their own opinion. Let
me therefore try to address these two exercises separately. A Chronology
1. There is an annual event in Kashmir known as the Amarnath Yatra, or
pilgrimage. It is a Hindu pilgrimage to a Shiv Ling in a cave in the
north-eastern part of the Kashmir valley. It has been extant for over
160-years now and is described as an event that is “quintessentially
Kashmiri” in that the cave was discovered by a Muslim family, tended to
by its descendants since the beginning and this for an exclusively
Hindu clientele.
2. In the early to mid 1990s the number of pilgrims began to grow. At
about that time, there were a series of natural calamities, tragically
killing several pilgrims. A special investigation was commissioned and
it made many recommendations (20 to be exact) that addressed issues
related to the environment and the logistics of pilgrim management.
3. In 2000, under the then State Government headed by Dr. Farooq
Abdullah, an Act was promulgated by the State Legislature providing
“for the constitution of a Board for the better management of the
…Yatra, upgradation (sic) of facilities for Holy pilgrim (sic) and
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and called the Shri
Amarnath Ji Shrine Board Act 2000”, now known as the SASB. The Chairman
of this Board was to be the Governor of the State, ex officio, and its
members were to be nominated by him. It stipulated a membership of not
more than ten members, including two Hindus of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. The Act was “enforced”, on February 2, 2001.
4. Between the end of 2004 and May 2008, there was a palpable strain in
the State’s governance structures, and not just between the two largest
coalition partners, the Congress and the PDP; the Office of the
Governor, through the coalescence of the latter office with that of the
Office of the Chairman of the SASB, also began to directly impinge on
the arguments about the yatra. The arguments were set off by the Chief
Executive Officer of the SASB who, in October of 2004, asked for the
transfer of approximately 455 acres of forest land for use by the SASB.
This order was rescinded in May of 2005 on the plea that it violated
the J&K Forest Conservation Act of 1997. It went to court and, in
May of 2008, resulted in the diversion of a hundred acres of land for
the use of the SASB for the duration of the pilgrimage.
5. At the beginning of this millennium the number of pilgrims was a
trickle, as the site was not well-known and very far away for most
people. However, in the last eight years the numbers have swelled
dramatically to now consist of well over several hundred thousand from
all over India. Like other pilgrimage spots, it is a source of very
substantial income, with benefits for locals who earn substantial
amounts by providing tourism services.
6. Concurrently, given the dispute over Kashmir, there were fears that
the yatra presented a security threat to the pilgrims with so many
Hindus coming to the State. This resulted in rather elaborate and
extensive army and security force arrangements. It was not entirely
without reason, as there were some attempts by elements with an
“Islamist” perspective to interpret the event as “cultural aggression”
and some attempts at disrupting the pilgrimage.
7. With the swell in the number of pilgrims and inadequate facilities,
the event threw up issues related to the length of the period of the
pilgrimage, the logistics of the arrangements for pilgrims and
environmental considerations. The pilgrimage also proved to be an
occasion for locals to become suspicions about this display of muscular
nationalism. It made the yatra, like much of anything in Kashmir today,
controversial to begin with and, soon, contentious.
8. The length of the pilgrimage had been fixed at one month, double the
original length. The SASB, led by then Governor Lt. General S. K.
Sinha, (a retired General of the Indian army) argued that it should be
for a longer period of two months; there was resistance from the PDP
towards this extension. The Government continued to dither, however,
and the PDP, also took up the issue publicly, arguably with an eye
towards the State elections which were due in October – November of
this year.
9. This and others matters related to the yatra were allowed to be
dragged, in part because of overt or tacit resistance to them and in
part because of political undercurrents. As the Congress-led coalition
of Ghulam Nabi Azad dithered over it, the term of the Governor was
about to expire on June 3, 2008. As Chairman and Governor, Sinha had
been particularly aggressive in his claims for the SASB, quite openly
calling himself a “proactive governor”, when his political role is
proscribed by the constitutions of the State and the country. It was
under these conditions that matters came to a head about a month and a
half ago.
10. The occasion for the proverbial spark was a press conference given
by his Principal Secretary, Dr. Arun Kumar, a middle level Indian civil
servant. During the press conference Kumar made three statements,
presumably with the consent of the Governor: (i) that it was a forgone
conclusion that the yatra, or pilgrimage, would be extended, (ii) that
the structures that were going to be built were not necessarily
temporary, (iii) that the land transfer was permanent and (iv) that the
State Legislature did not have any authority to interfere in the
matter. He also made some rather crude remarks about how “Hindu”
pilgrims were not as bad a local “Muslims” in damaging the environment.
It has come to be known as the “Hindu pollution versus Muslim
Pollution” remark.
11. Kumar’s remarks caused a furor and, predictably, all factions of
Kashmiri society, including the religious right, were loud in their
protests; they saw in these statements a vindication of their
suspicions about a “larger agenda” in the Amarnath pilgrimage. All
factions of the resistance took to the streets, being careful to assure
pilgrims, with in situ visits, that the protests were not against them
in any way, and that their safety was guaranteed. The gesture was
appreciated by the pilgrims and so placed on the record by some
national television stations and the local print media.
12. The acuity of the problem and events associated with it coincided
with the exit of Governor Sinha on June 25; he had tried to get an
extension of his term in office. This was not successful, albeit his
exit was delayed for several weeks. Enter the newly appointed Governor,
Mr. N. N. Vohra who, arguably, inherited an impossible situation.
13. One of the new Governor’s first acts, on the recommendation of the
Government, and in the face of rather loud protests from the radical
resistance (or “separatists”) was to reverse the government (or interim
court?) order that allowed the temporary transfer of the land to the
SASB. The agitation in Kashmir died down, amidst some rather crude
claims to “victory” which understandably irritated Jammu province.
14. This situation however, in turn, caused Jammu, the Hindu-majority
province of the State, to revolt. One person committed suicide, strikes
were called and the masses took to the streets. Significantly, the
cause was patronized by the State unit of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(or BJP), who further radicalized the demand by sloganeering against
Kashmiri chauvinism, the appeasement of Muslims and the continued
regional discrimination of Jammu.
15. The intensity and the expansiveness of the protests to this action
in Jammu, however, jeopardized the stability of the Government. Even as
implications of all this were being debated, the PDP chose to withdraw
support for it (on June 28, 2008) and call for a vote of confidence in
the State Assembly. Ghulam Nabi Azad, the Congress Chief Minister of
the State, sensing that he would lose a vote of confidence, resigned
(on July 7, 2008) and the State was put under “Governor’s rule”.
16. On June 27th, the Shiv Sena had threatened a blockade of the
national highway between Jammu and Srinagar; this materialized between
July 1 and 2, with active participation from the Sangh Parivar
including the BJP, VHP and the Bajrang Dal.
17. The protests in Jammu took an aggressively communal stand.
Progressively, trucks carrying supplies to Kashmir were stoned and
burnt, along the highway local Kashmiri vehicles bringing tourists and
pilgrims were stopped and many Kashmiri drivers were severely beaten.
(One of them, Muhammad Latief Wani of Pantha Chowk succumbed, to
injuries sustained on August 5th, on August 17 and three others, Bashir
A. Mir, Muhammad Abbas and Shah Sayar returned to Kashmir on August 15,
2008). As positions hardened, lost in the melee was the fact that land
order diversion had always been temporary.
18. In response to the blockade, the Fruit Growers Association, called
for a march to through Muzaffarabad and Pakistan (this is the fruit
harvest season and the blockade threatened huge losses for them). This
slogan was seized upon by both the radical resistance and the PDP, and
the agitation in Kashmir was renewed. The All Parties Hurriyat
Conference, which had been fragmented over the last five years or so,
reunited and fixed the date for a march to Muzaffarabad on August 11th,
2008.
19. The administration was caught off guard on the 11th, when by all
accounts well over one hundred thousand people began to march towards
the Line of Control that divides Kashmir between its Indian and
Pakistan Administered parts. The police and the paramilitary unit,
known as the Central Police Reserve Force, (CRPF) panicked and shot and
killed four people, including the Hurriyat leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz,
and injured scores of others.
20. This caused an outpouring of sympathy for the resistance and over
the next few days more than twenty people were killed during peaceful
marches and hundreds more were injured with bullet wounds, many if not
most, in the upper half of their torso.
21. On 16th of August, a crowd, by all accounts of well over one
hundred thousand Kashmiris (some placed the figure at over two hundred
thousand) marched towards Pampore, the village of the slain Hurriyat
leader, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, to attend a traditional memorial service.
The police did not attempt to stop the marchers and there was no
violence reported.
22. It is important to note here the formation of a “Coordination
Committee”, the circumstances of the genesis of which is as yet not
entirely clear, consisting of individuals from all walks of life in
Kashmir. It is this coordination committee that is charged with
deciding the future course of actions to be taken, including calls for
strikes and marches.
23. On August 18th, the people of Kashmir staged a march to the United
Nations offices to present a memorandum. This time the crowds had
swelled to over three hundred thousand (and some place the figure at
over five hundred thousand), there was no police action and there was
no violence. The huge crowd consisted of all factions of society and
different communities as well. It is worth mentioning here that during
this time, there was also a march expressing solidarity with the
Kashmiris in Kargil.
24. In a significant development, during a public speech on the 18th,
the Hurriryat leader Mr. Geelani declared that contrary to most
perceptions that Kashmiris did not have a leadership, the huge turnout
demonstrated that it did and that it was him, alone. Late on the same
evening, in a press conference, he apologized for his “slip of tongue”
and acknowledged that no individual was greater than the movement.
25. Inter alia the Hurriyat leadership, in previous public statements
made by the Mirwaiz, has made a set of three demands before the
Government of India before they consider calling off the agitation: (i)
that the notorious Armed Forces Special Powers Act should be revoked,
(ii) that the Government must release all political prisoners and (iii)
that the Government open the Muzaffarabad road for trade.
26. Meanwhile, Jammu remains uncompromising in its demand for
revocation of the SASB “land right”. In the last one month it has
formed something called the Shri Amarnath Sangarsh Samiti which is
leading the agitation and among its demands is the sacking of the
Governor, whom they see as being too Kashmir centric in this approach
to the problem. In competition against the Kashmiris, they have called
for a “jail bharo” or “fill the jails” march tomorrow, March 18th.
27. Another dimension of this imbroglio is the expansion of the
controversy to the rest of the country under the auspices of the BJP.
The latter, in a significant shift in tactics, has sought to shift the
focus from communalism and regionalism to the question of loyalty. In a
letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. L.K. Advani notes: “The problem
in J&K today is not Hindu versus Muslim; nor is it even Jammu
region versus the Valley. It is essentially nationalists versus the
separatists.” (Emphasis in the original).
28. Almost mirroring this approach is the position of the resistance in
the valley. They have been declaring that the protests no longer
reflect the controversy over the land. That it has gone beyond that and
that they will not settle for anything less than a resolution on the
J&K conundrum in its entirety. This is, in part, reflected by the
central position given to the demand to throw open the road from
Srinagar to Muzaffarabad to trade.
29. Meanwhile offices, schools, colleges, universities and shops were
closed for the better part of two weeks, inconveniencing the general
populace who, it must be noted, are not opposing these strikes although
some voice skepticism as to whether it will accomplish anything in the
face of a lack of real leadership. Life limped back to “normal” on
August 19th and remained so until Friday the 22nd, on which day the
Coordination Committee called for another march to Eidgah for the
Friday congregational prayers, after which it would outline its next
steps in the protests.
30. Following an August 17th meeting of the Coordination Committee of
the resistance, there were reports of a rift amongst the members. This
was denied by all the members, although two of its members, Shabir A.
Shah and Naeem Khan were excluded at a later meeting the same day.
31. On Friday August 22nd the Coordination Committee of the Hurriyat
called for the Friday congregational prayers to be held at Eidgah.
Informal reports put the number of people in the congregation at one
million, although even half that number would be an enormous gathering.
32. On August 22nd, Mr. Omar Abdullah, the President of the National
Conference, suggested that Delhi call “Islamabad’s bluff” and offer a
referendum on the Kashmir dispute. It was reported more sensationally
in the mainstream media, however. It is a step that has been suggested
by others several years ago.
33. On August 22nd, the Central Government announced that Sheikh Abdul
Aziz had not been killed by the security forces, suggesting that he had
been a victim of internecine rivalry. This was immediately and roundly
denied by the Hurriyat and its allied parties.An Initial AnalysisIt
is common place to hear, in some of the immediate analysis, that the
controversy has made “an issue out of a non-issue”. But this is to be
disingenuous; the situation has assumed critical proportions for some
very real reasons, without prejudice to the benign nature of text and
context of the actual order in relation to the land. The first of these
is that the Arun Kumar remarks were symptomatic of Delhi’s neglect of
the resistance and preoccupation with the economy when addressing the
Kashmir problem. It is impossible not to see in this predisposition a
kind of arrogance in the wake of India’s “emerging” status. Second, the
controversy has given the religious radicals on both sides of the
divide in the State (and now it seems the country) an issue to peg
their arguments on. Issues of identity quickly lead to a willingness to
shed blood, as events since the end of the old cold war have so starkly
shown us. Third, events have coincided with elections in J&K State,
huge political flux in Pakistan and “larger issues” at hand for India.
Despite all this, it is important that J&K not be given the short
shrift again. Fourth, the issue of land being appropriated by the
security forces, at the expense of Kashmiris, is not a new issue and
one that has been aggravating Kashmiris for a long time now. It has
been all but ignored. Fifth: an important lesson from this agitation is
that the average Kashmiri is much more politically schooled, aware and
savvy. They will not brook easy or opaque compromises. So if Delhi
fails to engage the radical resistance in dialogue at this time, it
will not be surprising if the current agitation throws up an even more
radicalized leadership, be it political or religious, or both. It will
be a long battle, for it is obvious that the overwhelming majority of
the people who are out on the streets these days are in the under 30
group, have grown up under the shadow of a siege mentality and are
inured to violence. With these biases in perspective, let me try to
identify some critical factors that will need to be taken into
consideration when addressing the situation in a focused, comprehensive
and transparent manner.
* At the outset, it is critical to note three things here that, on the
one hand, add fuel to the fire and, on the other hand, mark a
qualitative shift in the resistance. These are: (i) that the casualties
in Kashmir were in marked contrast to over three weeks of similar
demonstrations in Jammu where the proportion of casualties have been
considerably less, despite assaults on the police, before live
television cameras. This contrast between the two regions should not be
belittled against the facile and inaccurate cries of “regional
discrimination” being heard from Jammu. On this latter, see the latest
series of articles in Greater Kashmir by Alee Andrabi. (ii) that though
out the demonstrations in Kashmir there has been no use of weapons by
the “separatist” and “militant” factions of the radical resistance and
(iii) that the people of Kashmir are identifying a new form of
accountability for the resistance leadership in the formation of a
“Coordination Committee” which is watched by various wings of civil
society, business interests, political factions and professional
groups. It has become a truly people’s movement, despite the tendency
to trivialize or ignore this development on the part of the mainstream
media in Delhi.
* Next, in my opinion, there is a need to separate the short-term
problem of the SASB imbroglio from the long-term one of the Kashmir
conundrum, despite the fact that, as I have just suggested, they are
not unconnected. But for the moment let us just recall that both, the
resistance in Kashmir and the BJP-led agitation in Jammu, tend to link
the short and long term issues. This de-linking, however, is easier
said than done!
* The need to focus on the short-term measures, in order to show
progress or be successful, must be without prejudice to the long term
solution to the complex J&K problem, and must be overtly so stated
with a timetable for the resumption of serious talks with the
resistance. This need for a solution to the short-term problem asserts
itself because what is at stake is communal harmony, dialogue rather
than degenerating radicalized arguments on issues of identity and trust
building measures between the two regions, without which a solution to
the longer term problem will be further distanced.
* Delhi, for a long time now, has been playing a cat-and-mouse game
about talking to the “separatists”. In the light of the current
developments, this cannot continue. It must invite the Hurriyat in a
transparent and open discussion, which must be then shared with the
peoples of J&K, the country, South Asia and indeed the world at
large. Such accountability for Delhi and the Kashmiri resistance is
long overdue.
* Pakistan may be in a rather messy stage in its history at the moment.
But this cannot be a reason to sweep the discussion on Kashmir under
the carpet; or, indeed, other bilateral issues between India and
Pakistan. Delhi needs to engage with Islamabad on both issues, appraise
it of the facts on SASB controversy and ask for its neutrality towards
the solution to this immediate fire, rather than react to the standard
homilies that have been coming from Islamabad about the current
imbroglio in Kashmir.
* The SASB controversy has successfully deepened alienations within the
State, quite apart from the alienation of the ethnic and linguistic
Kashmiri which has been galloping apace. Jammu now is firmly on the map
of regional aspirations in a loud and radicalized fashion. On the other
hand, it must be noted that there was a march in favor of the Kashmiris
in Kargil during this debacle, and reports from Leh state that even the
Ladakhi Buddhists, whose skepticism of the Sindhu Darshan project has
caused it to be scrapped and renamed the Sengge Kha Babs Festival
(Sengge Kha Babs is the Ladakhi name for the Indus River) are
expressing muted solidarity for the Kashmiri fight against what is seen
as an increasingly assertive Hindutva project in the State.
* Delhi and Islamabad need to recognize that nothing is irreversible in
the face of any controversy that is mired in historical idiosyncrasies,
legal ambiguities and political inequity as is the J & K conundrum.
The SASB imbroglio is proof if it, if proof is needed. It cannot afford
to be ignored or solved in a haphazard manner, as has been the habit
until now.
* In the face of the above, it is difficult not to see this
spinning-out-of-control of the SASB imbroglio as a by-product of the
unfortunate muscular nationalist ambitions of an exiting Governor, a
communications failure that occurred in the context of the change-over
between two governors and the opportunistic invitation to the national
level BJP to patronize the grievances of Jammu.
* Regardless of the above complication that add yet another layer to
the J&K conundrum, it is my belief that such painful experiences
also present opportunities. All the stakeholders in the problem would
do well to recognize that the current phase presents an opportunity for
a giant step towards resolution. Consider this: over the last year or
so, the radical resistance or “separatists” have been moderating their
stand. On the other hand, the more “mainstream parties” have
radicalized their positions. This situation represents a window for New
Delhi and Islamabad to find a solution that will respond to this
emerging broad, or not necessarily diffuse, unity that Kashmir is
witnessing.* (Siddiq
Wahid, PhD, Vice Chancellor, Islamic University of Science &
Technology, One University Avenue, Awantipora, Kashmir 192122, J&K
State, India)
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